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PENAL CODE
TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
CHAPTER 6. CULPABILITY GENERALLY
Sec. 6.01. REQUIREMENT
OF VOLUNTARY ACT OR OMISSION. (a) A person commits an offense only
if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or
possession.
(b) Possession
is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the
thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a
sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.
(c) A
person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a
law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an
offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act.
Acts
1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended
by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1975;
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 3, Sec. 1, eff. Feb. 25, 1993; Acts 1993,
73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 6.02. REQUIREMENT
OF CULPABILITY. (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person
does not commit an offense unless he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the
definition of the offense requires.
(b) If
the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental
state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the
definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.
(c) If
the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental
state, but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent,
knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish criminal
responsibility.
(d) Culpable mental states are classified according to relative degrees, from highest to lowest, as follows:
(1) intentional;
(2) knowing;
(3) reckless;
(4) criminal negligence.
(e) Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged constitutes proof of the culpability charged.
(f) An
offense defined by municipal ordinance or by order of a county
commissioners court may not dispense with the requirement of a culpable
mental state if the offense is punishable by a fine exceeding the
amount authorized by Section 12.23.
Acts
1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended
by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Amended by:
Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 1219, Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2005.
Sec. 6.03. DEFINITIONS
OF CULPABLE MENTAL STATES. (a) A person acts intentionally, or with
intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his
conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
(b) A
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature
of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is
aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result.
(c) A
person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware
of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
(d) A
person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint.
Acts
1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended
by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 6.04. CAUSATION:
CONDUCT AND RESULTS. (a) A person is criminally responsible if the
result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either
alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause
was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the
actor clearly insufficient.
(b) A
person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if
the only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired,
contemplated, or risked is that:
(1) a different offense was committed; or
(2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise affected.
Acts
1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended
by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
