Harris County Criminal Defense Attorney Andy Nolen

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Harris County Criminal Defense Attorney Andy Nolen has over 22 years  experience representing persons accused of committing criminal violations of State and Federal law.

There are fifteen (15) Harris County Criminal Courts at Law. Each judge is elected to a four-year term. A Presiding Judge is elected every 6 months to chair administrative meetings. A Co-Presiding Judge is also elected to perform these duties when the Presiding Judge is not available.

The Presiding Judge: 1) serves as chief administrator of the offices of county court manager and county court coordinators, and of pretrial release services and all other court-related ministerial services in misdemeanor cases as required by the judges, 2) presides at any session of the judges; and 3) holds ex officio membership on all committees created by the judges in session that pertain to the goal of achieving more equal and efficient justice and the orderly dispatch of business.

Each court is staffed by representatives from several different offices and departments.

• The judge employs a court coordinator and the official court reporter.
• The court's official records are maintained and managed by assistant district clerks from the office of the Harris County District Clerk.
• Courtroom security and execution of court process is the responsibility of two deputies assigned by the Harris County Sheriff.
• Community Supervision (Probation) is represented by a court liaison officer from the Harris County Community Supervision and Corrections Department who processes offenders placed on supervision.
• Personal data regarding each arrestee used to determine suitability for release on personal bond is gathered by members of the Harris County Pretrial Services Department.
• Prosecution on behalf of The State of Texas is conducted by up to four assistant district attorneys from the Harris County District Attorney's Office.
• Defendants found by the judge to be indigent are assigned counsel from a rotating pool of local defense attorneys pursuant to the courts' local plan mandated by the Texas Fair Defense Act.

 Harris County Criminal Defense Attorney Andy Nolen treats  every person they represent as if they were a friend and neighbor.   When you call, likely Andy Nolen will answer your call himself.  You will be dealing with Attorneys, not secretaries, assistants, or answering machines.

 If we can be of any assistance, or you just want to talk about your situation, please call Harris County Criminal Defense Attorney Andy Nolen at 832-480-8951.

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GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

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PENAL CODE

TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

CHAPTER 6. CULPABILITY GENERALLY

Sec. 6.01.  REQUIREMENT OF VOLUNTARY ACT OR OMISSION.  (a)  A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession.

(b)  Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.

(c)  A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 3, Sec. 1, eff. Feb. 25, 1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 6.02.  REQUIREMENT OF CULPABILITY.  (a)  Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense unless he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the definition of the offense requires.

(b)  If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.

(c)  If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.

(d)  Culpable mental states are classified according to relative degrees, from highest to lowest, as follows:

(1)  intentional;

(2)  knowing;

(3)  reckless;

(4)  criminal negligence.

(e)  Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged constitutes proof of the culpability charged.

(f)  An offense defined by municipal ordinance or by order of a county commissioners court may not dispense with the requirement of a culpable mental state if the offense is punishable by a fine exceeding the amount authorized by Section 12.23.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Amended by:

Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 1219, Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2005.

Sec. 6.03.  DEFINITIONS OF CULPABLE MENTAL STATES.  (a)  A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(b)  A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

(c)  A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

(d)  A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 6.04.  CAUSATION: CONDUCT AND RESULTS.  (a)  A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.

(b)  A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that:

(1)  a different offense was committed; or

(2)  a different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise affected.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

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CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER

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PENAL CODE

TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

CHAPTER 7. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER

SUBCHAPTER A. COMPLICITY

Sec. 7.01.  PARTIES TO OFFENSES.  (a)  A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.

(b)  Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense.

(c)  All traditional distinctions between accomplices and principals are abolished by this section, and each party to an offense may be charged and convicted without alleging that he acted as a principal or accomplice.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.02.  CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER.  (a)  A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if:

(1)  acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, he causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense;

(2)  acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense; or

(3)  having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.

(b)  If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.03.  DEFENSES EXCLUDED.  In a prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibility is based on the conduct of another, the actor may be convicted on proof of commission of the offense and that he was a party to its commission, and it is no defense:

(1)  that the actor belongs to a class of persons that by definition of the offense is legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity; or

(2)  that the person for whose conduct the actor is criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of a different type or class of offense, or is immune from prosecution.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

SUBCHAPTER B. CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Sec. 7.21.  DEFINITIONS.  In this subchapter:

(1)  "Agent" means a director, officer, employee, or other person authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association.

(2)  "High managerial agent" means:

(A)  a partner in a partnership;

(B)  an officer of a corporation or association;

(C)  an agent of a corporation or association who has duties of such responsibility that his conduct reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or association.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.22.  CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION.  (a)  If conduct constituting an offense is performed by an agent acting in behalf of a corporation or association and within the scope of his office or employment, the corporation or association is criminally responsible for an offense defined:

(1)  in this code where corporations and associations are made subject thereto;

(2)  by law other than this code in which a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility on corporations or associations plainly appears; or

(3)  by law other than this code for which strict liability is imposed, unless a legislative purpose not to impose criminal responsibility on corporations or associations plainly appears.

(b)  A corporation or association is criminally responsible for a felony offense only if its commission was authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by:

(1)  a majority of the governing board acting in behalf of the corporation or association; or

(2)  a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation or association and within the scope of his office or employment.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.23.  CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PERSON FOR CONDUCT IN BEHALF OF CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION.  (a)  An individual is criminally responsible for conduct that he performs in the name of or in behalf of a corporation or association to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.

(b)  An agent having primary responsibility for the discharge of a duty to act imposed by law on a corporation or association is criminally responsible for omission to discharge the duty to the same extent as if the duty were imposed by law directly on him.

(c)  If an individual is convicted of conduct constituting an offense performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation or association, he is subject to the sentence authorized by law for an individual convicted of the offense.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 7.24.  DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION.  It is an affirmative defense to prosecution of a corporation or association under Section 7.22(a)(1) or (a)(2) that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

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ATTORNEY ANDY NOLEN: TEXAS PENAL CODE BURDEN OF PROOF

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PENAL CODE

TITLE 1. INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS

CHAPTER 2. BURDEN OF PROOF

Sec. 2.01.  PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.  All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that he has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with, the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 2.02.  EXCEPTION.  (a)  An exception to an offense in this code is so labeled by the phrase: "It is an exception to the application of . . . ."

(b)  The prosecuting attorney must negate the existence of an exception in the accusation charging commission of the offense and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant or defendant's conduct does not fall within the exception.

(c)  This section does not affect exceptions applicable to offenses enacted prior to the effective date of this code.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 2.03.  DEFENSE.  (a)  A defense to prosecution for an offense in this code is so labeled by the phrase: "It is a defense to prosecution . . . ."

(b)  The prosecuting attorney is not required to negate the existence of a defense in the accusation charging commission of the offense.

(c)  The issue of the existence of a defense is not submitted to the jury unless evidence is admitted supporting the defense.

(d)  If the issue of the existence of a defense is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge that a reasonable doubt on the issue requires that the defendant be acquitted.

(e)  A ground of defense in a penal law that is not plainly labeled in accordance with this chapter has the procedural and evidentiary consequences of a defense.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 2.04.  AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.  (a)  An affirmative defense in this code is so labeled by the phrase: "It is an affirmative defense to prosecution . . . ."

(b)  The prosecuting attorney is not required to negate the existence of an affirmative defense in the accusation charging commission of the offense.

(c)  The issue of the existence of an affirmative defense is not submitted to the jury unless evidence is admitted supporting the defense.

(d)  If the issue of the existence of an affirmative defense is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge that the defendant must prove the affirmative defense by a preponderance of evidence.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 2.05.  PRESUMPTION.  (a)  Except as provided by Subsection (b), when this code or another penal law establishes a presumption with respect to any fact, it has the following consequences:

(1)  if there is sufficient evidence of the facts that give rise to the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury, unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly precludes a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the presumed fact; and

(2)  if the existence of the presumed fact is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge the jury, in terms of the presumption and the specific element to which it applies, as follows:

(A)  that the facts giving rise to the presumption must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt;

(B)  that if such facts are proven beyond a reasonable doubt the jury may find that the element of the offense sought to be presumed exists, but it is not bound to so find;

(C)  that even though the jury may find the existence of such element, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the other elements of the offense charged; and

(D)  if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a fact or facts giving rise to the presumption, the presumption fails and the jury shall not consider the presumption for any purpose.

(b)  When this code or another penal law establishes a presumption in favor of the defendant with respect to any fact, it has the following consequences:

(1)  if there is sufficient evidence of the facts that give rise to the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly precludes a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the presumed fact; and

(2)  if the existence of the presumed fact is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge the jury, in terms of the presumption, that:

(A)  the presumption applies unless the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts giving rise to the presumption do not exist;

(B)  if the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts giving rise to the presumption do not exist, the jury must find that the presumed fact exists;

(C)  even though the jury may find that the presumed fact does not exist, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the offense charged; and

(D)  if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to whether the presumed fact exists, the presumption applies and the jury must consider the presumed fact to exist.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 912, ch. 342, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Amended by:

Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 288, Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2005.

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