 |
| Insanity Defense |
PENAL CODE
TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
CHAPTER 8. GENERAL DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Sec. 8.01. INSANITY. (a) It
is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the
conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or
defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.
(b) The
term "mental disease or defect" does not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
Acts
1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended
by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 2640, ch. 454, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 29, 1983;
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 8.02. MISTAKE
OF FACT. (a) It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through
mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his
mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission
of the offense.
(b) Although
an actor's mistake of fact may constitute a defense to the offense
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of any lesser included offense
of which he would be guilty if the fact were as he believed.
Acts
1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended
by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 8.03. MISTAKE
OF LAW. (a) It is no defense to prosecution that the actor was
ignorant of the provisions of any law after the law has taken effect.
(b) It
is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor reasonably
believed the conduct charged did not constitute a crime and that he
acted in reasonable reliance upon:
(1) an
official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of
permission by an administrative agency charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(2) a
written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court
of record or made by a public official charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
(c) Although
an actor's mistake of law may constitute a defense to the offense
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser included offense
of which he would be guilty if the law were as he believed.
Acts
1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended
by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 8.04. INTOXICATION. (a) Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of crime.
(b) Evidence
of temporary insanity caused by intoxication may be introduced by the
actor in mitigation of the penalty attached to the offense for which he
is being tried.
(c) When
temporary insanity is relied upon as a defense and the evidence tends
to show that such insanity was caused by intoxication, the court shall
charge the jury in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(d) For
purposes of this section "intoxication" means disturbance of mental or
physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance
into the body.
Acts 1973, 63rd
Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 8.05. DURESS. (a) It
is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the
proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by threat of
imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another.
(b) In
a prosecution for an offense that does not constitute a felony, it is
an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the
proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by force or threat
of force.
(c) Compulsion
within the meaning of this section exists only if the force or threat
of force would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of
resisting the pressure.
(d) The
defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly placed himself in a situation in
which it was probable that he would be subjected to compulsion.
(e) It
is no defense that a person acted at the command or persuasion of his
spouse, unless he acted under compulsion that would establish a defense
under this section.
Acts
1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended
by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 8.06. ENTRAPMENT. (a) It
is a defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the conduct
charged because he was induced to do so by a law enforcement agent using
persuasion or other means likely to cause persons to commit the
offense. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an
offense does not constitute entrapment.
(b) In
this section "law enforcement agent" includes personnel of the state
and local law enforcement agencies as well as of the United States and
any person acting in accordance with instructions from such agents.
Acts
1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended
by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 8.07. AGE
AFFECTING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. (a) A person may not be
prosecuted for or convicted of any offense that the person committed
when younger than 15 years of age except:
(1) perjury
and aggravated perjury when it appears by proof that the person had
sufficient discretion to understand the nature and obligation of an
oath;
(2) a
violation of a penal statute cognizable under Chapter 729,
Transportation Code, except for conduct for which the person convicted
may be sentenced to imprisonment or confinement in jail;
(3) a violation of a motor vehicle traffic ordinance of an incorporated city or town in this state;
(4) a misdemeanor punishable by fine only;
(5) a violation of a penal ordinance of a political subdivision;
(6) a
violation of a penal statute that is, or is a lesser included offense
of, a capital felony, an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a
felony of the first degree for which the person is transferred to the
court under Section 54.02, Family Code, for prosecution if the person
committed the offense when 14 years of age or older; or
(7) a
capital felony or an offense under Section 19.02 for which the person
is transferred to the court under Section 54.02(j)(2)(A), Family Code.
(b) Unless
the juvenile court waives jurisdiction under Section 54.02, Family
Code, and certifies the individual for criminal prosecution or the
juvenile court has previously waived jurisdiction under that section and
certified the individual for criminal prosecution, a person may not be
prosecuted for or convicted of any offense committed before reaching
17 years of age except an offense described by Subsections (a)(1)-(5).
(c) No person may, in any case, be punished by death for an offense committed while the person was younger than 18 years.
Houston Criminal Attorney Andy Nolen has over 22 years experience representing persons accused of committing criminal violations of State and Federal law.
Houston Criminal Attorney Andy Nolen treats every person they represent as if they were a friend and neighbor. When you call, likely Andy Nolen will answer your call himself. You will be dealing with Attorneys, not secretaries, assistants, or answering machines.
If we can be of any assistance, or you just want to talk about your situation, please call Houston Criminal Attorney Andy Nolen at 832-480-8951.
Houston Criminal Attorney Andy Nolen has over 22 years experience representing persons accused of committing criminal violations of State and Federal law.
Houston Criminal Attorney Andy Nolen treats every person they represent as if they were a friend and neighbor. When you call, likely Andy Nolen will answer your call himself. You will be dealing with Attorneys, not secretaries, assistants, or answering machines.
If we can be of any assistance, or you just want to talk about your situation, please call Houston Criminal Attorney Andy Nolen at 832-480-8951.
